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THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE OF DETERMINED FUTURITY

In my paper on Determined Futurity in Greek (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.178-181, 185-188) I endeavored to show that the non-volitive subjunctive in Greek, commonly accompanied by $\delta\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$, had in independent sentences a meaning properly designated by the term Determined Futurity, and that the non-wish optative, also commonly accompanied by one of the same particles, had two meanings, that of determined futurity and that of contingent determined futurity, the latter being derived from the former. In the present article, taking as a basis the conclusions of the former paper, I wish to show that the Latin subjunctive also possessed the meaning of determined futurity. The discussion, however, is confined to the present subjunctive and to that as it appears in independent declarative sentences. The treatment of the other tenses and of the subjunctive of determined futurity in questions and in subordinate clauses must be reserved for later discussion.

As commonly stated, the theory of the fusion of the subjunctive and the optative meanings of the Latin subjunctive is mechanical and seems to assume that a fusion of forms led to a fusion of meanings. If the contention of this paper is accepted, the theory will be stated as follows. In Latin as in Greek for subjunctive forms the determined futurity meaning developed from that of will and for optative forms the same meaning developed from that of wish. In addition subjunctive forms came to express wish and optative forms came to express will. The formation of the Latin subjunctive paradigms was brought about (1) through adaptation of certain forms to specific uses, and (2) through the operation of the principle of economy in the rejection of one of two forms having the same set of meanings. Omitting matters of detail, we may indicate the meanings of the Latin subjunctive and the historical relations of those meanings by the following table:

A. Subjunctive Forms.

1. Volitive (original meaning).
2. Optative (derived from the volitive).
3. Determined Futurity (derived from the volitive).
4. Contingent Determined Futurity (derived from determined futurity).

B. Optative Forms.

1. Optative (original meaning).
2. Volitive (derived from the optative).
3. Determined Futurity (derived from the optative).
4. Contingent Determined Futurity (derived from determined futurity).

It is impossible here to discuss at length the work of others bearing on the problems involved in this paper, and even specific references to such work are for the most part omitted¹. A 'future' meaning has been recognized as one of the forces of the Latin subjunctive by Rodenbusch, Hale, Delbrück, Blase, Kroll, and others. But the essential element of that modal meaning is not indicated by the term 'anticipatory' or 'prospective' or 'futurisch'. The essential element is that of *determination* by some law. The temporal (future) element is of little consequence and, indeed, often disappears. In rejecting the true potential ('may-can') as one of the meanings of the Latin subjunctive, I am in quite close agreement with Elmer, Frank, and Kroll. So far as a 'can' or a 'may' meaning appears in sentences, it is a mere implication, the modal meaning of the verb being something else. But the contingent determined futurity ('would-should') meaning, which has nothing to do with a 'may-can' potential, does occur in Latin. Further, the implication which leads to a translation with 'can' or 'may' is in no true sense 'potential'. The implication is either of capacity ('can') or of opportunity ('may'). The subjunctives of 'obligation' or 'propriety', for which meaning Hale and Elmer have contended, are easily explained as subjunctives of determined futurity. For the term 'determined futurity', I am indebted to Sonnenschein; but I use the term not, as does he, as a synonym of "natural necessity", but in a more general sense to include

¹Aside from the sections in the manuals of Latin grammar and of comparative grammar, the following articles and monographs may be referred to as dealing quite directly with the subject of this study or with some phase of it: Rodenbusch, *De Temporum Usu Plautino*; Hale, *The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin*; Elmer, *American Journal of Philology* 15.299 ff., and *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology* 6.175 ff.; Morris, *American Journal of Philology* 18.133 ff., 275 ff., 383 ff.; Bennett, *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology* 9.1 ff.; Hale, *Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 31.138 ff., *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 32.cxx ff., and *Classical Philology* 1.21 ff.; Delbrück, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* 9.326 ff.; Frank, *Classical Philology* 2.163 ff. and 3.1 ff.; Sonnenschein, *The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive*; Bradley, *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 42.5 ff.; Kroll, *Glotta* 7.117 ff.

determination by any law external to the speaker at the time of speaking. The distinction between external and internal determination is a fundamental one in the history of modal ideas, as has been shown by Bradley. As will be seen, I am in agreement at many points with Sonnenschein's treatment of the Latin subjunctive. But Sonnenschein's point of view differs very greatly from my own. He virtually disregards the results derived from the study of comparative syntax and seeks through a study of Latin alone to establish a fundamental meaning which shall give a unity to the Latin subjunctive. Determined futurity, as he uses the term, is one manifestation of the fundamental and unifying meaning of 'obligation'.² Hence, in place of recognizing the meanings of will and of determined futurity as distinct but historically related meanings, he can say of sentences containing ideas of volition (Unity, 24),

I regard the subjunctive inflexion as expressing in all cases that kind of obligation which is expressed in English by 'is to' or 'shall'.

Expressions of determined futurity fall into three principal classes, one of which has two subdivisions.

(1) The action or situation is one under the control of the speaker. In most cases, but not in all, the action will be the speaker's own. The determinant is the plan of action adopted by the speaker, who virtually expresses his resolve.

(2) The action or situation is one not under the control of any agent. The determinant is some law of nature, of deity, or of man.

(a) In the performance of the action or the bringing about of the situation there is no implication of effort on the part of an agent.

(b) There is an implication of effort on the part of some agent and hence an implication of capacity or of opportunity. By implication it is said that one is bound to *succeed* in doing.

(3) The action or situation is one under the control of some agent not the speaker. The determinant is logical or ethical. The agent is bound to do something in accordance with the laws of ethics or of logic, that is, he is bound to *choose* to do.

Owing to the fact that 'shall' has come to be a temporal auxiliary and has lost to a large extent its modal coloring, English in recent times has come to use the phrase 'am to', 'is to', etc., to express determined futurity. The several phases of this modal meaning as expressed by 'am to' are illustrated by the following sentences: (1) 'I am to go (in accordance with my own plan)'; (2a) 'He is to be appointed to the

position'; (2b) 'He is to win the race easily'; (3) 'You are not to find fault'.

(1) *The action is one under the control of the speaker, and the determinant is the plan of action adopted by him.* An example from Homeric Greek with the subjunctive is Il. 1.183; an example with the optative is Od. 14.155. These sentences express the determination of the speaker concerning his own action. The presence of $\kappa\epsilon$ shows that the modal meaning has crossed the line between the two fields of modal meaning, the internal, having to do with the desire of the speaker, and the external, having to do with the laws of nature, of deity, or of man. In such cases the law, to be sure, is one set up by the speaker himself, but at the moment of speaking it is external to himself. It has the same relation to the contemplated action as does the law of nature in the expression, 'Man is bound to die'.

In Latin we have as examples of the first person singular subjunctive of determined futurity with the plan of action adopted by the speaker as determinant those few passages commonly referred to as showing a subjunctive of 'resolve' or 'determined resolution' and explained as volitive: Haut. 273 Mane: hoc quod coepi primum enarrem, Clitipho; Bacch. 1049 Quid ergo istuc? quod perdundumst properem perdere. Other examples are Bacch. 1058, Men. 983, Trin. 748, and probably Most. 848 and Trin. 758. To these should be added the following commonly taken as interrogative³: Mil. 426 Me rogas? hem, qui sim? *Quin ego hoc rogem quod nesciam. Here belongs also one example with a negative⁴: Aul. 570 Non potem ego quidem hercle.

It would hardly be unfair to enlarge this list by the addition of examples of the ambiguous first persons of the third and fourth conjugations, such as occur in Asin. 605, 719, 816. In such cases the subjunctive form simply retains its determined futurity meaning, though elsewhere it has assumed a non-modal, that is, purely future one. Mention should be made, also, of the use of the first person present subjunctive after *quam* and *potius quam* in such a passage as Ad. 498 Animam relinquam potius quam illas deseram⁵. Other examples are Poen. 922, Mil. 311, Lucilius 208. The subjunctive is used in the semisubordinate *quam*-clause to express resolve, though the same modal meaning is expressed in the antecedent clause by the future indicative.

We have in Greek some examples of the first person subjunctive in independent sentences without $\delta\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$. It is possible that these are real volitives; and in view of their presence it is possible to claim that the Latin examples have the volitive modal meaning. But resolve is more commonly expressed in Homeric Greek by the subjunctive and the optative with $\delta\upsilon$ or $\kappa\epsilon$, that is, by the subjunctive or the optative of determined

²This concept of 'obligation' as defined by Sonnenschein ("determination by some law or some will") to be sure is in a sense the fundamental meaning of the Latin subjunctive; but it is so only because his "obligation" includes all modal meanings—the modal meanings of the English modal auxiliaries as well as those of the Latin subjunctive. This statement, of course, excludes the assumed modal meaning of 'fact'. But 'fact' is not a modal meaning; and the indicative as commonly used is non-modal. 'Fact' and 'possibility' as modal meanings owe their supposititious existence to the metaphysical distinction between reality and possibility.

³Compare Classical Philology 3.417.

⁴This character denotes change of speaker.

⁵Compare Kroll, Glotta 7.126.

⁶Compare Blase, Historische Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache, III.1.113.

futurity, as in the examples cited. This was a more effective mode of expression, since it indicated determination after reflection. However, the strongest indication that the explanation of the above examples herein adopted is correct is the fact that both Greek and Latin for the most part used the future indicative to express this meaning. Note the sentences containing *potius quam* referred to above. The modal character of the future is clearly indicated in Cist. 519 Non remittam: definitumst.

It is possible for one to speak of an act as determined by his own course of action and not use the first person of the verb, as in 'You are to perish beneath my spear'. Compare Il. 11.433, 17.197, 19.209. Naturally examples of this kind will show verbs in the passive voice or with a passive signification. As a Latin example with the second person may be cited Poen. 1409 Leno, quando ex nervo emissu's, compingare in carcerem. Compare Most. 1133 Non enim ibis. As examples with the third person may be quoted Most. 920 Hodie accipiat; Amph. 300 Clare advorsum fabulabor, hic auscultet quae loquar; Truc. 127 Peregre quoniam advenis, cena detur (so Bacch. 537). With *cena detur* is to be compared the common *cena dabitur*, and in Amph. 300 the future *fabulabor* is to be noted. The following examples also belong here: Asin. 671 Quidvis egestas imperat: fricentur. Dan quod oro?; Haut. 743 Eatur; Haut. 790 Fiat, quaeratur aliquid; Most. 1038 I mecum, obsecro, una simul. *Fiat. *Servorumque operam et lora mihi cedo. *Sume; Asin. 38 Fiat: geratur mos tibi; Eun. 1068 Prius audite paucis. . . *Audiamus. Professor Bennett calls such subjunctives as these Subjunctives of Compliance. Professor Hale classes them as Subjunctives of Consent, Acquiescence, or Indifference. That the speaker in each case complies with a command or a request is true; but compliance and indifference may be implied in the expression of various modal ideas. Compare Od. 1.395 with the subjunctive and *κεν*, Il. 24.226 with the bare optative, and Il. 24.619 with the optative and *κεν*. Compliance may be implied by the imperative, as in *sume*, Most. 1039, quoted above. It is frequently implied in the future indicative, as in Most. 401 Intus cave muttire quemquam siveris. *Curabitur. In place of *fiat* we sometimes have *fiet*, as in Merc. 302, and sometimes the active *faciam*, as in And. 681. In place of *mos geratur* we sometimes have *mos geretur*, as in Pseud. 22, or *morigerae erimus*, as in Most. 398.

Mention should be made here of such clauses with *potius quam* as the following, Asin. 816 Suspendam potius me, quam tacita haec tu auferas; Pseud. 554 Potius quam id non fiat, ego dabo. Compare above, on this page.

(2a) *The action or the situation is one not under the control of an agent.* It is asserted that the action is bound to take place or that the situation is bound to exist in accordance with some law of nature, of deity, or of man. There is no implication of determination

in accordance with logic or of ethics; there is no implication of effort on the part of an agent. A Greek example with the subjunctive is Il. 22.505 ("but now he must suffer much", Monro, Homeric Grammar, 252); one with the optative is Od. 17.546 ("therefore no partial death shall strike the suitors. On all it falls; none shall escape from death and doom", Palmer).

Neither in Greek nor in Latin are examples with the first person common. Compare Od. 19.598 with the optative, which Palmer translates with "must". Of the subjunctive, Il. 14.235 is possibly an example. In Latin at least two examples with the first person singular may be quoted: Trin. 1136 Sed maneam etiam, opinor: namque hoc commodum orditur loqui; Phor. 140 Ad precatorem adeam, credo. . . . These examples are commonly classed with those of determined resolution quoted above. That the feeling is quite different is indicated not only by the presence of *credo* and *opino*r but also by the context. In both cases there is a yielding to the force of circumstances. In the Trinummus, Lysiteles has just said, 'I'll speak with them', and continues, 'But no, it's on the program for me to wait, I think'. In the sentence from the Phormio, Geta says, 'Well I suppose I'll have to go to an intercessor'. For the feeling of a more or less reluctant yielding to necessity in sentences containing *opino*r, compare Cicero, Ad Att. 9.6.2 Sed opinor quiescamus, Ad Att. 2.5.1 Sed opinor excipiamus et expectemus, and Pro Murena 30 Quod si ita est, cedat opinor forum castris, etc.⁷ To the two examples with the first person singular quoted should probably be added the following, though the subjunctive may have the meaning of contingent determined futurity: Eun. 861 Debeam, credo, isti quicquam furcifero, id si fecerim.

Aside from certain idiomatic expressions only a few examples with the third person belong here. Compare Aul. 110 Id si relinquo ac non peto, omnes ilico me suspicentur, credo, habere aurum domi. In the following we have the subjunctive of determined futurity in two paratactic conditions: As. 465 Sit, non sit, non edepol scio: si is est, eum esse oportet. 'He shall be (suppose he is), he shall not be, I don't know (about either supposition)'.

Here belong the examples of the type *aliquis dicat*: And. 640 Ingeram mala multa? atque aliquis dicat 'Nil promoveris'; Eun. 511 Roget quis, 'Quid rei tibi cum illa?', ne noram quidem. In these sentences the modal meaning is not 'potential'. Moreover, there is no implication of capacity or of opportunity or of possibility. The speaker has no occasion to say that someone has the ability to say, or that circumstances permit of his saying, or that it is possible for someone to say. All that the words *aliquis dicat* directly express is, 'someone shall say', but the purpose of the expression is to present a supposition upon

⁷These examples belong under (3), below; in them the necessity is a logical one.

which the speaker wishes to comment. *Aliquis dicat*, therefore, is a paratactic condition, to which the idea of saying implied in what follows is the conclusion. We have the same ('postulative') use of the subjunctive of determined futurity in the passage from Petronius 77, quoted below, and in As. 465, quoted in the preceding paragraph^a.

The frequent use of *aliquis dicet*, as in Cicero, In Pisonem 68, furnishes almost conclusive evidence that the modal meaning of *aliquis dicat* was that of determined futurity. Evidence of the same kind is furnished by the use of *aliquis (quispiam) dixerit*, if *dixerit* is future perfect indicative, as Roby, Elmer, and Kroll maintain.

With the *sit* of the stereotyped *forsitan* should be considered the *fuat* of Pseud. 432 *Fors fuat an istaec dicta sint mendacia*. Here the speaker does not wish to say, 'It is possible that there is a chance whether'. Possibly the three words had come to be felt as a single adverb, but originally the meaning was 'It shall (is bound to) be a chance whether'. The subject of the verb has in it the idea of possibility; but that fact does not control the modal meaning of the verb. In Hec. 610 we have *fors* as the subject of *fuat* with a true optative meaning. Nor does *fors* when used adverbially give to the verb a 'potential' meaning. If it did, we should have to recognize a 'potential' indicative in Vergil, Aen. 11.50 *Fors et vota facit*. . . . The *sit* of *forsitan* (*fors sit an*) originally had the determined futurity meaning, as had *fuat* in *fors fuat an*.

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(To be concluded)

GERMAN VOCABULARY ENGLISH FROM GERMAN, THROUGH LATIN

Since many compound words in German have the same significance as words similarly compounded in Latin, and since these Latin words have in a large number of cases been incorporated into the English language, the pupil who is translating German will not infrequently be helped materially in finding the exact equivalent of a German word by first rendering the component parts of the word into the corresponding Latin compound. For example, take the word *Mitleid*. *Mit*, 'with', = Latin *con*; *leid*, 'suffering', = *passio* (from *pator*, *passus*). Hence, *Mitleid* = 'compassion'. Not only is there the advantage mentioned above, but, what is more important, this connection of ideas once discovered tends to fix meanings in a way otherwise impossible. In other words, this method tends to

^aCompare Kroll 7.123, 133. There seems to be little value in the comparison of *aliquis dicat* with *τις εἴπωσι*, Od. 6.275 and elsewhere, *τις εἴπωσι*—if that be the correct reading—, Od. 6.479, or *τις ἐπέει*, Il. 7.91, and elsewhere. In Aeschylus, Sept. 913, *τάχ' ἂν τις εἴπωσι*, the idea of possibility is expressed by *τάχ' ἂν*, just as it is by *fortasse* in Cicero, Sull. 84 *Dicet fortasse quispiam*.

increase, in a very positive way, the vocabulary, both active and passive.

Below is a table of the commonest German prefixes with their Latin equivalents, and examples of their occurrence in words that can be rendered into English through the medium of Latin, as outlined above.

Ab, Latin *de*, *e*, *ex*: Abartung, degeneration; abbauen, demolish; abbitten, deprecate; Abmagerung, emaciation.

an, Latin *in*, *ad*: anfänglich, incipient; Annäherung, approach, approximation; Anpassung, adaptation.

auf, Latin *super*, *ad*, *in*: Aufbau, superstructure; Aufhäufung, accumulation; Auflage, impost.

aus, Latin *e*, *ex*: ausarbeiten, elaborate; Ausdruck, expression; Ausgiessung, effusion; ausgenommen, except.

be, Latin *bon*: Bestand, constancy; bestätigen, confirm; Bestärkung, corroboration; begreifen, comprehend.

durch, Latin *per*, *trans*: Durchbohrung, perforation; Durchseihung, percolation; durchscheinend, translucent (compare the Greek derivative diaphanous); Durchgang, transit.

ein, Latin *in*: einäschern, incinerate; Einkleidung, investiture; Einschluss, inclusion.

ent, Latin *a*, *ab*, *de*, *e*, *ex*, *di*, *dis*: Entführer, abductor; enthaupten, decapitate; entsetzen, depose; entdecken, discover, detect; Entehrung, dishonoring; Entschuldigung, exculpation; entwurzeln, eradicate.

er, Latin *e*, *ex*: erbittlich, exorable; Erhöhung, exaltation.

fort, Latin *pro*: Fortschritt, progress; fortstossen, propel.

ge, Latin *con*: Gefolge, consequence; Gehalt, contents; Gestirn, constellation.

miss, Latin *di*, *dis*: Misslaut, dissonance; Missvergnügung, dissatisfaction.

mit, Latin *con*: mitarbeiten, cooperate; Mitklang, consonance; Mitleid, compassion.

nach, Latin *post*: Nachschrift, postscript.

über, Latin *super*, *trans*: Ueberblick, survey; überzahlig, supernumerary; Übergang, transition; Uebersendung, transmission.

um, Latin, *circum*: Umgang, circuit; umliegend, circumjacent; umschiffen, circumnavigate.

un, Latin *in*: unendlich, infinite; unerschöpflich, inexhaustible; Unmacht, impotence.

unter, Latin *sub*: unterschreiben, subscribe; unterseeisch, submarine; unterwerfen, subject.

ver, Latin *de*, *dis*, *ex*: verbeten, deprecate; verzüglich, delaying, dilatory; Verdreher, distorter; verweiben, effeminate.

vor, Latin (*prae*), *pre*, *pro*: voranordnen, preordain; vorführen, produce.

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